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 Neoliberalism and Patterns of Economic Performance: 1980 to 2000 
 Joseph Nathan Cohen  
 Miguel Centeno 
 
Neoliberal discourse often produces the impression that the world has 
undergone a wholesale shift towards laissez-faire, and that this shift has 
produced economic prosperity.  This chapter examines national economic 
data to discern the degree to which (1) governments have in fact retreated 
from the market, and (2) countries have enjoyed increasing economic 
prosperity over a period in which they have supposedly been liberalizing.  The 
evidence is mixed on both counts.  Although international interconnectedness 
appears to have grown over the past two decades, there is little evidence of a 
substantial scaling back of governments.  Over the same period, countries 
have not experienced any appreciable improvement in growth, cross-national 
equality, employment or national debt loads, although there is some evidence 
of improved price stability near the end of the 1990s. 
 
 The basic premises of economic policy-making have undergone profound shifts over the 
past three decades.  Between World War II and the economic crises of the 1970s, policy-makers 
relied on state power to ensure development and prosperity.  Governments regulated markets 
tightly, where they did not directly control them.  When a series of political and economic crises 
began to afflict the global economy, government interventionism was subject to a strong a 
intellectual and political backlash and a new ideological movement sought to resurrect an updated 
ethos of 19th century economic liberalism.  This new liberalism – neoliberalism –mandated the 
removal of governments‘ hold over the economy and the reintroduction of open competition into 
economic life. 
 Although the world is far from returning to the degree of liberalism typical of 19th century 
capitalism, the market  re-emerged as the central actor governing economic activity during the 
1990s, and the ethos of neoliberalism progressively entrenched itself into law and public 
institutions throughout the world.  This shift in ―policy paradigms‖ implies a substantial 
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reorganization of domestic political economies as well as the international order.  It promises 
many benefits, but also presents many concerns and risks many unintended consequences.  The 
neoliberal transition is a high-stakes endeavor:  market-oriented reforms involve tradeoffs, in 
which some of the societal ideals that were pursued, and to some degree achieved, during the 
postwar era (social security, consumer and worker protections, improving wealth and income 
equality) may ultimately be lost.   
 Discussions about the costs and benefits of market liberalism, and about how far to go 
with them, have been a central feature of political economic debates at the turn of the 20
th
 century.  
One‘s attitude toward the debate depends on how strongly one believes that market liberalization 
will benefit one‘s own economic welfare and the welfare of those in other countries and 
occupational groups.  A priori framings of this problem can influence observers‘ conclusions 
about these costs and benefits. 
At one extreme, some of the economic literature has began with the assumption that 
markets allocate optimally, attributing free markets to developmental success stories and 
assuming market failure where development is lagging.  For example, observers have criticized 
neoliberal theory as having been founded on the mistaken belief or false pretense that the Asian 
Miracles (like South Korea and Taiwan) were laissez-faire economies, and that their 
developmental success supports the view that market liberalization spurs development (Rodrik 
1996; Bruton 1998).  Many studies begin with the assumption that the market allocates societal 
resources optimally, and employ and analytical convention of (1) depicting how a fully free 
market could achieve some kind of optimal allocation of resources, (2) showing empirically how 
existing societies fall short of this optimal allocation, and (3) prescribing policies that rework 
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economies in ways that make them more closely approximate the free-market ideal.  In many 
ways, however, such an analysis generates a priori answers to complex economic policy 
questions.   
Nonetheless, it would be just as prejudiced to assume that market reforms are inherently 
detrimental to economic welfare.  Much of the anti-globalization rhetoric, for example, condemns 
market mechanisms without providing a detailed alternative with which to evaluate economic 
policy.  Criticisms can begin with a supposition that unfettered markets are harmful to the poor, 
but is this so different from beginning with a supposition that they are benevolent?  We believe, 
therefore, that a first step in weighing the pluses and minuses of neoliberalism must be an 
empirical test of how economies have performed during earlier phases of worldwide market 
liberalization.  
 What do we stand to gain or lose by this resurrection of laissez-faire?  A clearer 
understanding of the trade-offs involved in market reforms over the past thirty-plus years will 
help clarify what we can expect to gain and lose from these reforms in the future.  Looking at the 
past may help us decide, as members of both a national and global society, whether we are happy 
with the path upon which current economic policy is traveling.  The present work represents the 
first step in a larger project analyzing the last quarter century.  As such, it is explicitly limited to a 
description of these transformations on a global scale; later work will focus on causal 
relationships.  Details of the data and methods employed in this study are given in Appendix A.  
Specific operations will be discussed when analyses that use them are first presented.
1
 
 Our analysis proceeds in four parts.  First, we provide an overview of the neoliberal 
transition. Second, we examine the degree to which various macroeconomic and government 
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financial statistics reflect this transition.  Third, we consider macroeconomic implications of the 
neoliberal transition by looking at changes in patterns of output growth, inter-state income 
distribution, unemployment price stability and public indebtedness since 1980.  Finally, we offer 
conclusions based on the foregoing analyses.  
 
THE NEOLIBERAL TRANSITION 
 During the 1970s and 1980s, chronic societal crisis and economic stagnation spread across 
much of the world, and, most importantly, within many wealthy and powerful countries.  This 
turmoil set off a wide-ranging and conflict-ridden discussion over the proper organization and 
role of economic institutions.  Conservative social movements began to attack the state-market 
solutions that had been put in place during the immediate postwar period, in which governments 
assumed substantial control over domestic economic activity and maintained a variety of barriers 
to insulate national economies from foreign trade and capital flight.  After a period of polarized 
conflict, much of the world settled into a new era in which those who favored abolishing the 
instruments of state intervention established hegemony, dominating the discipline of economics, 
national governments, and supra-national organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank.   
 Most importantly, market advocates acquired a large degree of intellectual and political 
authority in the English-speaking world, which endowed them with tremendous influence in 
reworking the rules of international trade and finance.  By the 1990s, the neoliberal regime had 
influenced economic policy-making in a great majority of the world‘s nations, and its legitimacy 
was solidified by a worldwide economic boom that appeared to offer nations great opportunities 
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for growth by attracting the massive amounts of capital that were then circulating through global 
financial markets.  Although the neoliberal paradigm continues to be fought over today, it has 
nonetheless re-engineered much of the world economic system and has become substantially 
more ingrained in the fabric of our economic institutions.  
 Many factors contributed to the crisis of late-20
th
 century capitalism, but not all were 
apparent to contemporary observers.  What seemed clear to analysts during the 1970s and 1980s 
was that economic progress had been stalled by a political gridlock involving business, unions, 
political interest groups, and many observers began to comprehend this stagnation in more 
political terms (e.g., Olson 1982).  The alarm over state intervention was only partly generated by 
the perception that governments‘ stronghold on economic activity was generating rent-seeking 
opportunities.   
 In the United States and United Kingdom, this alarm was compounded by a growing sense 
that their economies required a major overhaul to maintain competitiveness with other rapidly-
developing economies in Western Europe and Japan (Portes 1997; Fourcade-Gourinchas and 
Babb 2002).  During the late 1970s, these two nations began to liberalize their economies 
substantially and by the early 1980s the United States and a newly-upgraded United Kingdom, 
along with a few important success stories in the less-developed world (such as Chile), generated 
a momentum  that would influence the rest of the world and induce them to undertake similar 
economic reforms.   
 Students of the contrast between the pre- and post-1970s economic regimes have 
identified several dimensions of difference between the postwar period of ―embedded liberalism‖ 
(Ruggie 1982) and the post-crisis era of neoliberalism. Table 2.1 presents a schematic 
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representation of these differences (note that the adjectives used to describe each regime are 
relative to each other).  Under embedded liberalism, trade barriers, and capital controls were high 
and the state wielded great power over the private sector and, particularly, international capital 
interests.  Unions were strong and business highly regulated and taxed to provide resources for 
secure social spending.  Publicly owned enterprises were common, and national leaders sought to 
promote economic growth by cultivating internal markets.  Currency prices were set by 
multilateral agreements (most notably the Bretton Woods Accords) rather than global markets, 
and international policy-making focused on geopolitical issues arising from the Cold War. 
 TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE 
 All this changed with the rise of neoliberal policies in the years after 1980.  Trade barriers 
were reduced, controls on capital were loosened, state-owned companies were privatized, 
regulatory regimes were dismantled, currencies were decontrolled, and taxes were lowered.  The 
net effect of these policy changes was to reduce the power of the state relative to capital, undercut 
the influence of labor unions, and threaten the long-term security of social spending.  State 
policies sought to promote growth through export industrialization and policy attention focused 
on economic competition rather than geopolitical conflict.   Despite setbacks owing to the spread 
of terrorism, a sharp economic recession, and a rising tide of protest against trade and 
globalization, these structural reforms largely remain in place. 
EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
 To what degree did the neoliberal paradigm shift actually mold economic reality in its 
own image?  The effect of neoliberalism has been strong in government rhetoric, economic 
history and public commentary, but how much has actual economic policy or activity really 
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changed?   If the actual, rather than theoretical, economy has made a neoliberal shift, we would 
expect to see less government intervention, lower taxes, fewer tariffs, open borders, smaller 
redistributive transfers, less regulation, and freer financial flows.  Here we look for evidence of 
the neoliberal revolution by examining national macroeconomic and  financial data.  Specifically, 
we consider how government spending, international trade, and international capital flows have 
changed between the crisis years of the 1970s and the year 2000.  
 In general, available data suggest that the policy and macroeconomic changes realized 
under the neoliberal policy regime are more complex than is often assumed.  The findings of this 
section are similar to others indicating that neoliberalism did not involve an unambiguous shift 
towards smaller government, more open borders, and freer markets in government policies (Kiser 
and Laing 2001).  Neoliberalism was not a wholesale movement towards market-guided 
economies but more of a gradual reconfiguration of the state-market relationship (Campbell and 
Pedersen 2001).  Although the neoliberal transition appears to have brought about a dismantling 
of trade barriers and capital controls, and a substantial increase in the volume of international 
capital flows, it is not clear that the shifts have brought about corresponding changes in the 
volume of global trade, government budgets, or social spending. 
Level of Government Spending 
 In theory, neoliberalism‘s return to the market should have coincided with smaller 
government budgets and fewer redistributive transfers.  We expect government spending to 
contract for several reasons.  First, government expenditures serve as a proxy for the size of state 
operations.  If government operations have scaled back since the 1970s, we naturally expect this 
to be reflected in reduced expenditure levels.  Second, much government spending is dedicated to 
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redistributive transfers, which constitute non-market transactions (and hence market distortions in 
neoliberal thinking).  If governments were dedicating themselves to promoting the market as a 
mechanism of allocation, we would expect these transfer payments, and, in turn, government 
expenditures to decline.  Third, government spending also constitutes a form of Keynesian fiscal 
intervention.  Government expenditures affect the circulation of money within an economy, and 
thus serve as a means by which governments can intervene to influence markets.   
 To test for reduced government spending we examined changes in (1) the ratio of final 
government expenditures to GDP and (2) the relative share of government expenditures dedicated 
to redistributive purposes.  The former measure, which approximates total government spending, 
is plotted in Figure 2.1 for 95 different countries from 1980 through 1999 as a series of box plots 
(which graphically depict the median, inter-quartile range, and extreme values).  As can be seen, 
this series displays no substantial downward trend.  Although governments may have reduced 
their overall spending somewhat, they generally did not lower it by much.   
 FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE 
 Table 2.2 compares average government spending relative to GDP for the same 95 nations 
in 1980 and 1998.  The first column shows the overall average at both dates and the remaining 
columns break show changes in spending by percentile of government spending in 1980.  As can 
be seen, there was a slight overall decline between 1980 and 1998, with government expenditures 
going from an average of 15.4% of GDP in the former year to 14.7% in the latter.  Even this 
modest decline in government spending, however, was concentrated in a few high-spending 
nations.  Indeed, among countries that were in the lowest 10% of the distribution in 1980, 
government spending actually increased, going from 8.6% to 9.2%.  Moving up through the 25
th
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to the 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles, we see relative stability in government expenditures, with either 
no change or small downward movements.  Only among nations in the 90
th
 percentile of spenders 
in 1980 was there a significant downward movement, with relative government expenditures 
going from 23.0% to 21.7% of GDP.   
 TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE 
 Thus, spending reductions appeared only in the most free-spending nations—those 
countries that traditionally had very large budgets relative to domestic output.  Overall, though, 
summary statistics suggest that relative government spending was quite stable during the 1980s 
and 1990s.  This conclusion is reinforced when the data are broken down by region.  Figure 2.2 
shows trends in relative government spending levels in four world regions from 1975 to 1999.  
These data do not indicate a substantial decline in any region with the exception of North Africa 
and the Middle East, an oil-exporting region that established unusually lavish social programs 
during the early years of the boom when they were awash in petrodollars.  This spending was 
progressively reduced over the years, a trend that was reinforced by a  a decline in military 
spending by belligerents in the regional wars of the 1970s (e.g., Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan) and 
1980s (Iran and Iraq).  The data for the OECD, in particular, are remarkably stable and no 
downward trend at all.  Although Latin American spending went down during the 1980s it rose 
again during the 1990s to regain lost ground.   
 FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE 
 Overall, these data cast serous doubt on the notion that there was a significant change in 
government spending because of neoliberalism.  Among the 95 countries for which we have 
expenditure data for the entire period, the mean annual rate of change in the ratio of spending to 
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GDP was 0.57% with a standard deviation of 2.4%, and the mean rate of change in government 
spending did not significantly vary between the 1980s and 1990s.  Very few countries had an 
annual rate of government expenditure to GDP change that exceeded 1%, and the great majority 
of countries whose average rate of budget size changes exceeded this 1% band were less-
developed countries that had experienced military conflict or a windfall of oil revenues during or 
near the period under study.  Overall, a strong neoliberal story is not evident in aggregate 
government spending statistics. 
 As a final test, we estimated a fixed-effects model of government spending over time.  The 
data and estimation procedure are described in Appendix A, and the results are presented in Table 
2.3.  This analysis suggests that there has been a slow government scale-back since 1980, 
although the small coefficient indicates that the average decline over the 1980 and 2000 was 
marginal.  On average, the decline was only around five hundredths of a percentage point per 
year.  At this rate, it would take a country at the 75th percentile of spending over 100 years to 
reach the spending level of countries at the 50th percentile.  Looking at government cutbacks by 
decade, the regressions suggest a general movement toward government budget reductiond during 
the 1990s, but the rate of decline was still very slow: only 0.13 percentage points per year.  These 
are very small declines, and the model fit is very poor, with R
2
 values hovering perilously close to 
zero. 
 TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE 
 In sum, when we look at the world as a whole, we find no appreciable change in 
government spending relative to GDP except in North Africa and the Middle East, no sustained 
pattern of government movement away from social spending, and only a very modest average rate 
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of annual spending reduction.  The reductions we do observe are less impressive when we 
consider that the 1990s were a period of worldwide economic growth, and that this growth likely 
eased some of the burdens to push government spending upwards.  In conclusion, we find little 
evidence for a major overhaul of the size government budgets during the 1980s and 1990s as 
neoliberal programs were applied throughout the world. 
Structure of Government Spending 
 Another possibility is that government spending did not recede since 1980, but changed 
the areas to which funds were allocated.  Governments may have reduced expenditures dedicated 
to social spending and domestic market regulation, but increased spending to skew international 
markets in their favor (e.g., through subsidies, government services dedicated to export firms, and 
other measures).  Present-day students of economic development note that governments can at 
times successfully intervene in domestic economic activity by bolstering exports or cultivating 
high value-added industries (Evans 1995; Brohman 1996).  Such a development might be seen as 
a shift in a neoliberal direction if we understand government intervention to be limited to 
supplementing private firms that are deeply engaged with international market forces.  This 
section reveals that this did not happen. 
 Figure 2.3 shows changes in the proportion of government budgets dedicated to selected 
functions.
2
  Within the countries examined, most budget items did not change markedly.  There is 
some evidence of slow and sustained declines in defense spending, government wages, and 
economic subsidies since 1980, but regression analyses performed to see if these declines were 
statistically significant generally had a poor fit.  The fixed-effects models shown in Table 2.4 
accounts for no more than 2% of the temporal variation in spending, indicating that the passage of 
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time alone does not explain much.  Although the coefficients are statistically significant, they 
predict rather moderate reductions: just 1 percentage point every five years.  Though statistically 
significant, these declines are not particularly rapid.  If we project these results forward, at this 
rate defense, public service and subsidy expenditures would be eliminated from budgets in around 
35, 75 and 20 years, respectively, in the average country.  Clearly, these items would hit floors 
beyond which they would not be reduced further, but the exercise provides a sense of how quickly 
the cutbacks are being made. 
 FIGURE 2.3 AND TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE 
 If the structure of government spending were substantially influenced by neoliberal 
doctrine, we especially would expect to observe falling support for traditional populist 
interventions in the economy—redistributive transfers, economic subsidies, and public services.  
However, a glance at Figure 2.3 suggests that government payments for such redistributive 
programs generally did not decline.  The validity of this impression is confirmed by fixed-effects 
models that we estimated to predict spending on public order, health, education, and welfare from 
the passage of time.  All the models show zero or very minute changes.  Moreover, whenever a 
statistically significant change is observed, the effect of time is positive, meaning that if there is 
any  discernable trend at all, it is that governments dedicate more of their budgets to redistribution 
during the imposition of neoliberal policies.  Although government resource allocations were 
reduced in some cases, the sifts were confined to a particular subset of areas: defense, wages and 
subsidies.  Other forms of social spending generally remained constant or increased slightly, even 
if they did not increase as a percentage of national budgets.   
 TABLE 2.5 ABOUT HERE 
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PRIVATIZATION 
 Much of the image of neoliberalism as decimating government programs comes from the 
extensive publicity given to the privatization of state enterprises.  Clearly, privatization was 
extremely important and led to dramatic changes in the quality and accessibility of services for 
citizens in some countries; and obviously it had significant consequences for employees in many 
state-owned firms.  According to one estimate, privatizations form 1970 to 1995 produced $132 
billion in revenues and liquidated at least 47,456 firms, though half of the revenues and 40% of 
the firms came from a single region: Latin America (Bouton and Sumlinski 1996).  The 
privatization boom appeared to peak in 1997, and closer to end of the decade, another study 
estimates that the total proceeds were $735 billion and involved 75,000 enterprises (Privatisation 
International 1998).  Until we obtain more systematic data, however, we cannot use privatization 
to indicate ―less government‖  (see 
http://www.privatization.org/database/trendsandstatistics.html). 
 
EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 In addition to limiting government spending, neoliberalism was also supposed to have 
dismantled barriers to trade.  Government intervention and economic controls are believed to be 
less tenable in the globalized world, where nations compete for highly mobile capital and 
multinational corporations are free to move operations to capital-hungry, compliant countries in 
the less-developed world.  Some observers argue that governments thus forced to lower taxes and 
tariffs to attract foreign investment and to prevent domestic capital from fleeing (Kaiser and Laing 
2001).   
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 Unfortunately, the increase in international trade has been described as both a reason for 
implementing neoliberalism and a consequence of it, so the direction of causality is not 
completely clear.  During the neoliberal era, currencies and public debt instruments did grow 
increasingly dependent on ―hot‖ (highly mobile) capital that was increasingly traded within 
international markets.  In this context, investors and traders demanded economic liberalization as 
a signal of credit- or investment-worthiness.  Nations had to open their borders to avoid market 
failures, cultivate competitiveness, discourage corruption, and forestall indolence.  
 To test whether the post-1980 period was more open to trade, we examined changes in 
government policy with respect to two factors:  trade insularity, operationalized by import and 
export tariff levels, and the actual volume of trade, measured by the ratio of imports and exports 
to GDP).  We indeed find a dramatic change in tariff levels.  After 1980, export tariffs were 
virtually eliminated from the policy repertoires of national governments.  Although import tariffs 
remained strong through 1989 (and in some cases even increased), they clearly declined between 
1990 and 2000.   
 In contrast, changes in the volume of trade after 1980 were  more complex.  On average, 
trade increased slowly under neoliberalism.  In much of the world, trade levels remained stable or 
even declined between 1980 and 1990 and then only rose after 1990.  Nonetheless, the latter 
increase was generally not dramatic; only the small club of ―Asian Tigers‖ (South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore) experienced a rapid growth of trade throughout the period, and one 
might even question whether this increase can be attributed solely or even primarily to the 
imposition of neoliberal trade policies.   
Tariffs  
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 The era of embedded liberalism institutionalized a variety of impediments to trade, but 
these barriers lost credibility and were dismantled in the wake of the 1970s crises.  Import 
substitution was discredited and the Uruguay round of the GATT finally moved trading nations 
towards the establishment of the World Trade Organization.  The WTO reflected a new economic 
philosophy that was much more intolerant of trade barriers, and paradigms emphasizing the use of 
trade taxation as an instrument of economic policy began to lose political legitimacy.  In this 
section, we attempt to chart these shifts by looking at shifts in trade tariffs.  The analyses reveal a 
clear decline in tariff levels. 
 Figures 2.4 and 2.5 depict changes in the world distribution of import tariffs, as a 
proportion of government tax revenues and as a proportion of export values, respectively.  The 
former graph indicates the degree to which governments depended on tariffs as a source of 
revenue, and the latter states the level at which imports were taxed.  Since 1987, the world 
distribution of import duties, either as a proportion of tax revenues or of import value, has been 
decreasing.  By the late 1990s, the sample countries collectively displayed substantially smaller 
import tariffs.  Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the same two statistical series, except for export duties.  
These results are even more dramatic:  they suggest that the export duty approached extinction as 
a policy instrument in the 1990s.  
 FIGURES 2.4-2.7 ABOUT HERE  
Total Trade 
 Thus, taxes on trade have been steadily declining across the world since 1980.  Export 
duties have nearly been eliminated as a policy instrument and tariffs have been decreasing at a 
steady rate.  An increase in the volume of international trade does not follow axiomatically, 
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however.  If nations are increasingly engaged in international trade, we expect to observe growth 
in the total value of imports and exports relative to GDP.  We term this ratio ―trade intensity‖ and 
in Figure 2.8 graph it using boxplots for 90 countries from 1975 through 1999.  As these data 
show, trade intensity experienced a slight contraction during the 1980s and then grew at a fair 
pace during the 1990s.   
 FIGURE 2.8 ABOUT HERE 
 Nonetheless, the graph does not demonstrate clear, substantial changes in the worldwide 
distribution of trade intensity until around 1993, after which trade the dispersion in volumes 
spread out.  Table 2.6 compares the level of trade intensity in 1980 versus 1999 at different 
percentile points the distribution of trade in 1980.  This tabulation shows that trade expanded over 
most of the distribution.  Only nations at the 25
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles registered declines, and they 
were small.  In general, therefore, we discern a slight increase in trade over the neoliberal period, 
which Table 2.7 verifies statistically using fixed-effects models.  The right-hand columns estimate 
two models to explain change in trade intensity over the entire 1980-1999 period.  One model 
controls for change in GDP whereas the other does not.  No matter how specified, the coefficient 
for time is positive and significant, indicating that trade increased over the period.  Nonetheless 
the fit of the model is relatively poor, with only 4%-5% of the variation in trade intensity being 
associated with the passage of time.   
 TABLES 2.6 AND 2.7 ABOUT HERE 
 Corresponding to this poor fit, the coefficients suggest that trad increased, on average, by 
just one percentage point every two years.  Though significant statistically this effect is 
substantively small.  At this pace, it would take countries at the median of trade intensity 38 years 
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to reach the trade level of countries at the 75th percentile.  Given such a slow rate of  increase, 
one might well argue that the shifts have less to do with the spread of liberalism than with 
exogenous factors, such as advances in telecommunications technology, improvements in 
transportation infrastructure, or the accumulation of capital by multinational firms.   
 The left-hand columns of the table present fixed effects models estimated separately for 
the 1980s and the 1990s.  This disaggregation suggests that trade intensity experienced two 
distinct phases:  a period of contraction during the 1980s (with an average decline in trade 
intensity of one half of a percentage point per year) and one of expansion in the 1990s (with an 
average increase of one percentage point annually).  This contrast could mean that trade levels 
were tied to cyclical factors—declining during the stagnant 1980s and booming during the 
expansionary 1990s—but this does not appear to be the case.  Even though the growth of trade is 
strongly associated with changes in GDP, controlling for the latter does not affect time trends.   
Holding shifts in GDP constant, between 1980 and 1989, trade intensity still exhibits a general 
pattern of decline and between 1990 and 1999 one of increase. 
 Trends in median trade intensity are graphed by region in Figure 2.9.  These statistics 
show that the growth of trade was substantial in Asia, grew more slowly in OECD nations, and hit 
a ceiling after 1995 in Latin America and the rest of the world.  One possible interpretation is that 
neoliberalism has had an effect, but that its effect has been restricted to a limited subset of 
countries:  China and the Asian Tigers, whose trade intensity rose rapidly and durably over the 
entire period. 
 FIGURE 2.9 ABOUT HERE 
EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS 
  18 
 In addition to lowering trade barriers, neoliberalism also sought to reduce barriers to 
international capital mobility.  During the era of embedded liberalism, much of the world imposed 
a regime of relatively heavy financial regulation and controls on the movement of capital 
(Dombrowski 1998).  Economic turmoil during the1970s discredited these policies, which were 
eventually discarded along with trade taxes.  Although this change comprised an important part of 
the package of market liberalization, the degree to which capital flows actually increased is an 
empirical one.  In this section, we examine whether the volume of international investment has 
changed since 1980 by looking at changes in the ratio of gross foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
national GDP. 
 Figure 2.10 presents boxplots showing trends in the distribution of this ratio among 64 
nations from 1980 to the year 2000, and Figure 2.11 shows trends in the median ratio of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP) by region over the same period.  These 
graphs provide clear evidence of the increasing mobility of foreign direct investment during the 
last decades of the 20
th
 century.   FDI levels show a clear pattern of acceleration after 1980 at the 
global level.  This acceleration hit a plateau during the late 1990s outside of the OECD, but 
continued through 2000 among nations in that organization.  In general, FDI picked up 
momentum in the mid-1980s and rapidly accelerated during the 1990s.  By 2000, the median level 
of gross FDI was 5.5 times greater than the 1980 median, a proportional increase that is 
observable across all percentiles of the 1980 investment distribution (data not shown).  Thus, the 
empirical data offer a clear testament to the degree to which capital flows favored the OECD.  
 FIGURES 2.10 AND 2.11 ABOUT HERE 
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 FDI began to stagnate in the rest of the world at some point during the 1990s.  FDI in 
emerging Asian nations dropped in 1994 and appears to have stagnated since then; and 
investment in both Latin America and the Warsaw Pact reached a plateau around 1998 or 1999.  
FDI ballooned in the OECD in the wake of the Third World economic crises that cut investment 
in developing markets, indicating the accumulation of a very large stock of mobile capital and its 
flight to the safety of developed nations at the end of the 20
th
 century. 
EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
 In the previous section, we examined the degree to which government policy and 
economic activity reflect a greater market orientation since the spread of the neoliberal policy 
paradigm.  Government interventions undertaken in the mid-20th century appear to have 
progressively receded since the crisis years of the 1970s, and some argue that this trend will 
continue into the foreseeable future.  The neoliberal future promises societal benefits, although 
these benefits are not necessarily clear.  Liberalization has promised society a lot of things. 
 Just how many problems can market liberalization alone solve?  What specific benefits 
can be realized in an economically-liberalized world?  In this section, we examine the economic 
advances realized between 1980 and 2000 in terms of output growth, income distribution, price 
volatility, employment, and national debt.   
Economic Growth 
 In this section, economic growth is measured by the annual rate of change in real GDP 
(measured in 1995 US dollars).  Figure 2.12 presents box plots showing changes in the 
distribution of GDP growth between 1976 and 2000.  This figure suggests a long, worldwide 
recession from 1976 to around 1982.  Since then there has been a stabilization in growth rates 
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(with the exception of 1991 and 1992).  Across nations, rates of GDP growth appear to have 
hovered between 0% to 5% until roughly 1993.   
 FIGURE 2.12 ABOUT HERE 
 Table 2.8 shows changes in percentile values for five-year intervals between 1976 and 
2000.  The table depicts the high degree of variance in economic growth before 1980, and the 
degree of stability-within-contraction until the mid-1990s.  During the economic boom of the 
1990s, the lower parts of the distribution of GDP growth improved and most of the world 
experienced growth in the 2% to 5% per annum range.   How strong was this growth?  Overall, it 
is difficult to appraise the performance of economic growth in different historical periods because 
there are so many factors that determine what the maximum rate of GDP growth could be.  
Crouzet (2001:206, 215) reports that during their ―golden years‖ Western Europe and the USSR  
had growth rates of 4.6 and 4.8%, respectively, compared with 2.5% per annum in OECD 
countries generally. 
 TABLE 2.8 ABOUT HERE 
 Post-1980 growth has been inferior to growth during the period1945 to 1975 in most areas 
of the world, except, of course, for the emerging markets of Asia.  Nonetheless, GDP growth has 
generally outpaced population growth.  Whereas national populations grew at an average annual 
rate of 1.79%, GDP rose at a real average rate 2.47% per year between 1980 and 1998.  These 
averages hide considerable underlying variability, however.  Indeed, a majority of the world‘s 
countries (some 56%) experienced an average rate of population growth that exceeded their 
average rate of economic growth.   
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 GDP growth rates under neoliberalism are thus far from the century‘s best, and, in most 
nations are being outpaced by population growth.  Figure 2.13 compares median levels of GDP 
growth across regions.  Since 1980, China and the Asian Tigers have clearly led the world in 
economic growth.  Growth rates in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the former Warsaw 
Pact have been chronically poor, although Sub-Saharan Africa did appear to perform fairly well 
after the mid-1990s.  The correlation between real GDP in 1980 and 1997 is 0.98, suggesting little 
change in the rank ordering of countries by wealth.  The Asian Tigers, China and the OECD are 
the only regions to enjoy absolute real gains in per capita GDP, and parts of Asia have grown 
much faster than the OECD as a whole.  Latin America lagged behind the OECD, and several 
regions have contracted since 1980.   
 FIGURE 2.13 ABOUT HERE  
Distributional Equality 
 Neoliberalism has been predicted to influence distributional equality in two ways.  First, 
some have argued that neoliberal policies increase inter-societal inequality; and second, others 
have predicted that market liberalization exacerbates the distribution of wealth and incomes 
within nations.   The most direct way to measure wealth inequality between nations is to compare 
real per capita GDP across countries.  If neoliberal reforms that have reduced inequality between 
countries, then we should see smaller differences between the world‘s rich and poor countries.   
 To examine such changes, we developed a ―Distance from Rich‖ (DFR) ratio.  This 
measure uses the United States as a benchmark against which all other countries‘ income levels 
are compared as depicted in the following formula: 
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     GDP(pc)Local  
 GDP(pc)DFR =    ------------ 
     GDP(pc)USA 
 
 
Following Firebaugh‘s (1999) insistence on the need to control for purchasing power in studies of 
international income inequality, all GDP figures are expressed as U.S. dollars adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (PPP).    
 Table 2.9 depicts the average distance-from-rich ratio by region for the period from 1975 
to 1999.  If economies were gaining on the United States in terms of national income, the DFR 
ratio would move closer to 1.0 over the period.  As can be seen, however, most of the regional 
mean ratios did not increase, but fell.  Whereas income growth in the OECD generally maintained 
parity with that in the United States (the ratio was 0.73 and 0.72 in 1995), it lagged behind in the 
nations of OPEC, the Warsaw Pact, Latin America, the Middle East outside of OPEC, and the rest 
of the world (all of which experienced declining DFR ratios).  Only China and the Asian Tigers 
gained ground on the United States.   
 TABLE 2.9 ABOUT HERE 
 In other words, after 1980 people in most of the world‘s nations came to earn less 
compared to citizens of the United States.  One problem with the foregoing DFR is that it uses a 
single country as the benchmark.  It is thus possible that an exceptional burst of US growth 
caused the measure to artificially inflate inter-country inequality.  The right-hand columns of 
Table 2.9 therefore re-scale the DFR measure by taking average per capita GDP in the OECD as 
the benchmark.  Even with this re-scaling, however, the data still show that inequality is 
  23 
increasing.  As before, with the exception of the emerging Asian markets, the non-OECD world 
fell further behind the OECD in terms of per capita GDP. 
Price Stability 
 Neoliberalism emerged as an alternative policy paradigm in the midst of the chronic 
stagnation and inflation that prevailed after the dissolution of the Breton Woods fixed exchange 
rate system.  Financial instability was a root of the economic crises of the 1970s (Block 1977), 
and market liberalization was identified as a means of settling price problems (Stiglitz 2002).  In 
this section, we examine the degree to which prices and currency exchange rates have stabilized 
by measuring the frequency with which countries have experienced years with high price inflation 
or major changes in their exchange rates. 
 Inflation is measured by annual changes in the GDP deflator and consumer price indices.  
Figure 2.14 presents box plots showing annual changes in the GDP deflator between 1975 to 1999 
in 72 non-OECD countries.  Figure 2.15 presents a box plot of annual changes in the consumer 
price index for a sample of 81 countries.   Both figures show increasing variation in the 
distribution of inflation over the period studied.  During the 1970s, the world distribution of 
inflation rates was tightly distributed at very high levels (>10% per annum), which means that 
most of the world‘s countries were experiencing rapid increases in general price levels.  As 
market liberalization proliferated across the world, countries‘ price stability appeared to diverge – 
price increases became more controlled in some parts of the world while they stayed high in 
others.  Again, the outside values were suppressed in these graphs, but the most extreme spells of 
price increases that were suppressed occurred between 1984 and 1992, not during the more 
interventionist years of the 1970s.  Inflation, however, appears to have been nearing containment 
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across the world as the 1990s approached its end. 
 FIGURES 2.14 AND 2.15 ABOUT HERE 
 Figure 2.16 depicts changes in the regional median rate of inflation as measured by the 
consumer price index.  This graph suggests that price growth has generally declined with the 
spread of neoliberalism.  However, two regions experienced notable spells chronically high 
inflation: Latin America during the 1980s and the Warsaw Pact countries during and after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  With the onset of the economic boom of the 1990s, however, 
inflation generally declined.  The control of inflation first occurred in the OECD around 1980, 
and the rest of the world appears only to have caught up and began to approach price stability 
during the late 1990s. 
 FIGURE 2.16 ABOUT HERE 
Employment 
 This section examines changes in employment rates since 1980.  Only 29 countries had 
unemployment data for the entire period between 1980 and 1999. Figure 2.17 depicts the annual 
average unemployment rate for this set of nations.  The figure suggests that there has been no 
substantial, sustainable reduction in unemployment over the neoliberal period.  Figure 2.18 shows  
changes in the standard deviation of unemployment over the same period to reveal that between-
country variance has been diminishing.  There does not appear to have been an increase in 
employment levels in our sample since 1980, and the between-country variation in employment 
levels have decreased.  Insofar as this necessarily selected sample can be used to make general 
statements about neoliberalism, therefore, market liberalization does not appear to have 
substantially affected unemployment levels, although it may have cultivated a convergence of 
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cross-national differences in rates of unemployment.   
 FIGURE 2.17 AND 2.18 ABOUT HERE 
National Debt 
 During the 1970s, states throughout the world incurred large amounts of debt, which 
created a variety of macroeconomic problems and pushed many states to the brink of bankruptcy 
(Sachs 1989a).  In this section, we consider whether the burden of public debt has eased since the 
spread of neoliberalism.  Data on public debt are much more abundant after 1993, but trends in 
debt performance between 1980 and 1993 are perhaps more germane to our discussion.  To cope 
with this missing data problem, we examined two different sub-samples:  a limited sample of 
nations from 1980 to 2000, and a larger sample from 1993 to 2000.  
 Figure 2.19 presents box plots for the limited sample of nations between 1980 and 2000.  
This figure shows that public debt grew rapidly from 1980 to 1986 and again from 1991 to 1995, 
suggesting that states did not manage to pay down large debts accrued during the crises of the 
1970s.   Box plots for the expanded sample are presented in Figure 2.20.   This figure also shows 
growing levels of public debt up to 1995, a slight contraction in 1996 and 1996, followed by a  
continued debt in growth after 1997.  Figure 2.21 compares changes in debt levels within the 
OECD and three major emerging markets.  The graph shows that the median level of debt 
dropped in the OECD after 1993, but that debt levels in the emerging markets began to rise after 
1995.  This trend of declining OECD debt and increasing non-OECD debt is reinforced by Figure 
2.22, which compares box plots of debt levels for both groups. 
 FIGURES 2.19-2.22 ABOUT HERE 
CONCLUSION 
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 The economic crises set off by the OPEC Oil Boycott of late 1973 spawned a  
transformation of the global economy and the states within it.  Globally, the postwar system of 
fixed exchange rates and limited capital mobility was abandoned, and domestically under the 
banner of ―the Washington consensus‖ nations were pushed toward the liberalization of markets.  
Led by the United States and multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank, after 1980 developing nations were pushed toward a package of ―neoliberal‖ 
reforms that included a reduction of total government spending, restricted social spending, 
privatization of state enterprises, lowering tariff and trade barriers, and decontrolling capital 
markets.  By ―freeing‖ national and international markets from the heavy hand of the state, 
neoliberal reformers believed that numerous economic benefits would follow: greater economic 
growth, reduced inflation, lower unemployment, and falling national debt. 
 In this chapter we have marshaled available data to assess to what extent the package of 
reforms envisioned by neoliberal theorists was implemented, and to measure their economic 
consequences in different nations.   As is often the case when one moves from the ideal world of 
policy prescriptions grounded in economic theory to their implementation and performance in 
practice, we found quite a variable record of success.  The degree to which the package of reforms 
was actually applied varied depending on period, region, and the specific reform under 
consideration, and the economic consequences of these inconsistently and at times incompletely 
applied reforms varied depending on the period, region, and outcome considered. 
 In theory, neoliberal reforms were supposed to lower total government spending, but we 
found no compelling evidence of a meaningful downward trend in government spending relative 
to GDP during the final decades of the 20
th
 century.  Countries that reduced government spending  
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did not do so by much and most of the reductions occurred in nations that were the most 
profligate spenders in the first place, notably oil-exporting nations in the Middle East that had 
erected lavish spending programs when they were suddenly awash in petrodollars and later had to 
scale back from these unrealistic levels.  
 Moreover, although neoliberal reformers called for limitations on government social 
spending and critics of neoliberalism accept as an article of faith that reductions in social 
spending must have occurred, we found very limited evidence to support these expectations.  
Although spending on defense, government salaries, and economic subsidies did appear to decline 
in accordance with neoliberal doctrine, many redistributive state transfers—such as housing, 
health, welfare and education—did not.  In the sample of countries we examined, these categories 
of social spending were, if anything, increasing as a proportion of national budgets.  Thus, despite 
the pointed rhetoric of its adherents and critics, neoliberalism did not bring about a massive 
downsizing of government or a decimation of social spending.  In the end, shifts in the level and 
pattern of state spending were modest and often opposite the predicted direction. 
 One area in which the implementation of neoliberal reforms did bring about expected 
changes was with respect to international trade.  Among the sample of nations we considered, 
trade generally increased as a share of GDP for most countries, although the rate of growth was 
rather slow and it is not at all clear whether all or part of it can be attributed to the spread of 
neoliberal doctrine and policies.  Nonetheless tariffs did fall dramatically, both as a share of 
government tax revenues and relative to total trade value.  Moreover, the shift away from taxing 
trade was observed both for imports and exports, but was especially pronounced for the latter.  By 
the end of the century, export tariffs had largely disappeared from the policy repertoires of all 
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national governments. 
 The privatization of state-owned enterprises also appeared to follow in expected fashion 
from the adoption of neoliberal policies.  Between 1970 and 1995 more than 47,000 public firms 
were sold to private investors raising revenues of $132 billion.  However, half of the revenues and 
40% of the firms were Latin American, suggesting the implementation of this policy prescription 
was regionally limited.  Moreover, the wave of privatization appeared to crest around 1997 and 
was drawing to a close by century‘s end. 
 Another key structural reform recommended by the architects of neoliberalism was the 
decontrol of capital markets to spur international investment.  Under neoliberalism we therefore 
expect to observe rising capital mobility, and when we considered trends in foreign direct 
investment we did find a sustained increase over the last two decades of the 20
th
 century.  The 
degree to which capital mobility accelerated, however, varied by region.  Foreign direct 
investment increased most consistently in OECD nations, and rose exponentially during the 
1990s.  Within emerging markets, however, foreign direct investment slowed during the latter 
half of the 1990s and reached a plateau as ―hot‖ (mobile) investment funds sought refuge from 
economic turmoil in developing regions by investing in the world‘s more developed economies. 
 In sum, the extent to which neoliberal policies were actually implemented to transform the 
structure of national economies depends on which policy domain and region one considers.  
Government spending was not significantly reduced during the neoliberal era, nor shifted 
decisively away from social programs; and although capital mobility increased in nations 
throughout the world, the resulting volatility in global capital markets caused foreign direct 
investment to level off in most countries by the mid 1990s, surging ahead only in the OECD.  
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Likewise, the 1980s and 1990s did witness tens of thousands of privatizations, but the transfer of 
assets from public to private hands was disproportionately concentrated in Latin America and had 
largely ended by 1999.  The only neoliberal policy that nations appeared universally to implement 
was a reduction of tariffs on trade, yielding a widespread, though rather modest, annual increases 
in the volume of trade from 1980 to 2000.   
 Thus the implementation of neoliberal policies was rather uneven around the world, but 
what about the presumed economic benefits?  In general, neoliberalism did not deliver on its 
promises of economic growth.   In general, the two decades following 1980 were not stellar 
periods of GDP expansion.  Rates of economic growth were, on average, about half those 
prevalent at mid-century and in much of the Third World growth has stagnated.  The principal 
exceptions to this pessimistic assessment are the emerging Asian markets, which have led the 
world in growth and maintained rates of expansion surpassing those of Western Europe during its 
―Golden Years‖ of 1950 to 1970.  In a majority of the world‘s nations, rates of growth in GDP 
have not even exceeded rates of population growth, yielding an decline in living standards. 
 Neoliberalism also appears to be associated with growth in economic inequality between 
nations.  After 1980 people in most nations came to earn less compared either to citizens of the 
United States or to the residents of OECD nations.  Only the emerging markets of the Asian 
Tigers and China gained ground from 1980 to 2000 on OECD nations in terms of per capital 
GDP.  Moreover, levels of national debt generally increased in response to neoliberalism.  Public 
debt grew consistently in all nations through 1993, but thereafter levels of national debt fell 
within the OECD, leaving most developing nations to surge ahead.  Our analysis also showed no 
substantial reduction in unemployment during the neoliberal period, though inter-country 
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variation generally fell suggesting a convergence of cross-national differences in jobless rates.   
 Aside from the expansion of global trade, neoliberalism‘s only other unambiguous success 
is the control of inflation.  Although two regions experienced notable spells of high inflation— 
Latin America during the 1980s and Warsaw Pact nations during the early 1990s—the economic 
boom of the late 1990s brought inflation down throughout the world.  The legacy of the neoliberal 
period thus appears to be stable prices and a greater orientation of nations toward trade and 
international investment, but little job creation, rising inequality, and a declining standard of 
living in most nations outside the OECD, with the notable exception of the China, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and South Korea.  
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Table 2.1.   A comparison of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism. 
                                                                                                                                                   
                                                          Embedded Liberalism            Neoliberalism 
Characteristic                                    1945-1980                             1980-2004                           
Trade Barriers    High    Low 
 
Capitol Control   High    Low 
 
Power of State Relative to Capital High    Lower 
 
Strength of Unions   Strong    Weakening 
 
Business Regulation   Strong    Weakening 
 
Status of Social Spending  Secure    Less Secure 
 
State-Owned Enterprises  Prevalent   Disappearing 
 
Development Strategy  Domestically-Generated Export-Oriented 
 
Focus of Government Policy  Geopolitical Conflict  Economic Competition 
 
Currency Markets   Prices Set by   Prices Set by  
       Multilateral Agreements Global Markets 
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Table 2.2.   Summary distributional of government expenditures relative to GDP for 102 
countries in 1980, 1990 and 2000.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
                                                                    Percentile                           Standard 
Year               Mean               10
th
       25
th
     50
th
      75
th
      90
th
            Deviation                     
1980  15.7  9.0 10.4 14.1 19.7 23.0  6.7 
1990  15.6  8.6 10.6 14.1 19.0 24.4  7.1 
2000  14.8  8.6 10.5 13.9 18.7 22.7  5.6 
Source:  World Development Indicators 
 
UPDATED
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Table 2.3.  Fixed-effects model estimated to predict trend in government spending 
                                                                                                                           
                       1980-2000             1980-1989                    1990-2000      
Year  -0.080***  -0.052*  -0.127***   
  (0.011)  (0.025)     (0.026)             
 
Constant 16.248***  16.096***  15.713*** 
  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.155)    
 
rho  0.76   0.88   0.82    
sigma_u 5.71   6.11   5.95    
sigma_e 3.18   2.28   2.77    
 
R
2
  0.02   0.00   0.02    
 
N  2,121   1,010   1,111    
N_g  101   101   101   
__________________________________________________________________ 
*** p<.001, *p<0.05 
Standard errors in parentheses under coefficients 
 
UPDATED
  37 
Table 2.4.  Fixed effects models estimated to predict government spending in selected areas. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
                               Defense                         Wages                     Subsidies       
Variable               B              SE             B              SE              B              SE                          
Year  -0.002***   0.000 -0.002***   0.000 -0.002***   0.000 
 
Constant  3.972***    0.447   3.504***   0.612  3.881***   0.658 
 
Rho   0.86    0.86    0.96 
Sigma U  0.08    0.10    0.10 
Sigma E  0.03    0.04    0.02 
 
R
2
 Within  0.12    0.06    0.05 
R
2
 Between  0.01    0.05    0.22 
R
2
 Overall  0.02    0.01    0.00 
 
N of Cases   564     499     221    
N of Groups     27       24      20 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
*** p<.001 
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Table 2.5.  Fixed Effects models of change in selected budget allocations over time 1975-1999. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
                                Public Order      Health          Education          Welfare           Housing      
Year    0.045***  0.001***  0.000     0.002***  0.001*** 
   (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Constant           -86.789***  -1.547*** -0.330  -3.936*** -1.270***  
            (19.214) (0.309) (0.315) (0.522) (0.211) 
Goodness of Fit 
     Rho    0.85    0.81    0.83    0.94    0.52 
     R
 2 
(Within)    0.06    0.04    0.00    0.11    0.04 
     R
 2 
(Between)    0.18    0.05    0.01    0.01    0.02 
     R
 2 
(Overall)    0.08    0.01    0.00    0.01    0.03 
 
Number Cases   
     Years     379     626     626     538      863 
     Groups       29       29       29       25        47 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
*** p<.001 
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Table 2.6.   Summary distributional statistics of trade intensity in 1980, 1990 and 2000, 102 
countries.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
                                                                      Percentile                           Standard 
Year                Mean                10
th
       25
th
     50
th
      75
th
      90
th
            Deviation                     
1980  62.8  28.2 43.2 54.8 80.0 106.5  31.8 
1990  60.9  30.9 40.6 53.6 72.7 104.8  31.3 
2000  72.7  34.1 49.1 66.7 89.1 116.8  35.6 
 
UPDATED
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Table 2.7.   Fixed effects model predicting trend in trade intensity 1980-1999. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
     Period 1980-2000          Period 1980-1989              Period 1990-2000 
Year   0.596***   -0.404***      1.141***   
   (0.043)   (0.094)         (0.094)            
 
Constant  55.840***   60.127***      59.267*** 
   (0.501)   (0.501)      (0.558)    
 
rho   0.86    0.92           0.91    
sigma_u   29.80    29.70           31.51    
sigma_e  11.89    8.53           9.89    
 
r2_w   0.09    0.02            0.13    
N   2,100    1,000    1,100    
N_g   100    100         100   
*** p<.001   
 
 
UPDATED 
  41 
Table 2.8.  Summary statistics for real GDP (PPP) growth 1980-2000, 102 countries. 
                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                 Percentile                           Standard 
Years                Mean               10
th
      25
th
      50
th
      75
th
      90
th
            Deviation   
1981 to 1985  0.67  -6.05 -1.82 1.26 3.56 6.02  5.11 
1986 to 1990  1.16  -4.56 -1.30 1.66 3.83 6.42  4.76 
1991 to 1995  0.93  -5.28 -1.40 1.51 3.79 6.54  6.40 
1996 to 2000  1.80  -2.31 0.11 2.19 3.80 5.97  4.25 
2001 to 2004  2.18  -1.95 0.11 1.71 3.70 6.70  5.92 
Total   1.31  -4.28 -0.80 1.69 3.74 6.29  5.34 
 
 
 
UPDATED 
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Table 2.9.  Average distance-from-rich ratios computed by region for selected dates and periods. 
                                                                                                                                                      
                                             1975-              Raw Values             Scaled to OECD 
Region                                  1999               1980    1995               1980     1995           
OECD    .72  .73 .72   --  -- 
OPEC    .36  .57 .31  .78 .43 
Asian Tigers   .31  .25 .42  .34 .58 
Ex-Warsaw Pact  .24  .33 .19  .46 .26 
Latin America   .20  .23 .18  .31 .25 
Rest of World   .18  .30 .15  .41 .20 
Non-OPEC Middle East .13  .15 .11  .20 .16 
Sub-Saharan Africa  .07  .07 .07  .10 .09 
China    .06  .04 .10  .05 .13 
South Asia   .06  .05 .06  .07 .09 
Total    .27  .32 .24  .28 .21 
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Figure 2.1.  Government expenditures as a ratio of GDP in 100 countries 1980-2000. 
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Figure 2.2  Medians ratio of government expenditures relative to GDP for 95 
countries in selected world regions 1975-1999. 
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Figure 2.3.  Median percentage of government budget dedicated to selected kinds of spending in 
95 countries. 
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Figure 2.4.   Import duties as a percentage of tax revenues in 38 countries 1997-1998. 
 
 
 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
Im
p
o
rt
 d
u
tie
s
 (
%
 o
f 
ta
x 
re
v
e
n
u
e
)
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
excludes outside v alues
Sample of 38 Countries (36% OECD) - 1975 to 1998
Import Duties as Tax Revenues
 
  47 
 
 
Figure 2.5.  Import duties ad a percentage of imported value in 43 countries 1975-1997. 
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Figure 2.6.    Export duties as a percentage of tax revenues in 39 countries 1975-1997. 
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Figure 2.7.    Export duties as a percentage of export value in 34 countries 1977-1998. 
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Figure 
2.8.   
Intensity 
of trade 
in 90 
countries 
(24% 
OECD) 
1975-
1999. 
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Figure 2.9.    Median trade intensity by region 1975-1999 
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Figure 2.10. Gross foreign direct investment in 64 countries 1980-2000.   
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Figure 2.11.  Gross foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP by region 1975-2000. 
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Figure 2.12.  Annual percentage increase in GDP in 96 countries 1976-2000. 
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Figure 2.13.  Average annual rate of growth in GDP among 96 countries by region 1976-2000.   
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Figure 2.14. Box plots showing distribution of GDP deflators in 72 non-OECD countries 1975-
1979. 
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Figure 2.15. Box plots showing variation in consumer price index for 81 countries 1975-1999. 
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Figure 2.16.   Annual change in consumer price index by region 1975-1999.   
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Figure 2.17.   Rates of unemployment in 29 countries 1980-1999. 
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Figure 2.18.   Standard deviation in rate of unemployment in 29 countries 1980-1999. 
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Figure 2.19.  Public debt as a percentage of GDP in 27 countries (40% OECD) from 1980 to 
1999. 
 
 
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
P
u
b
lic
 d
e
b
t 
 (
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
)
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Sample of 27 Countries (40% OECD)
Public Debt - 1980 to 1999
 
  62 
Figure 2.20.   Box plots showing variation in public debt as a percentage of GDP of 87 countries 
from 1993 to 1999. 
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Figure 2.21.  Median public debt as a percentage of GDP in selected world regions 1993-1999. 
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Figure 2.22.   Box plots showing variation in distribution of public debt as a ratio of GDP in 
OECD and non-OECD countries 1993-1999. 
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